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Some scholars place violence as prominent in an earfy stage of a social
movemel1t, whereas others argue that violence is cbaraaenstic of a later
stage. This paper addresses the question of whether there is a specific
movement stage that is particular!J charaaen·i!d I!J violence through an
analYsis of the shi-shi movement (1858-1864). The shi-shi movemelzt
helped create the revolutionary situation which cubnil1ated in Japan's Meiji
Restoration (1868). Violence wasprominent andconsequential in theshi-
shi movement andwasfound throughout the career of the movement. This
stutfy of a single case is by no means suiJicient to claim primary over
existing models of theplace of violence in social movements. The shi-shi
movement, however, signijical1tlY varies from theoretical models that link
violent actions to a specific movement stage.
Social movements have careers. They go through stages as they
emerge, develop, and decline. Scholars have characterized successive
stages of social movements as indicated by the forms of action found in
each stage. Violence is one of the indicators used to identify the action
said to typify particular social-movement stages. In this paper, I examine
the pattern of violence in stages of the shi-shi movement in 19th century
Japan in comparison with two ways in which scholars have linked
violence to phases of social movements.
Violence is one type of action often associated with social
movements. Research on violent actions in social movements mainly
addresses two issues. One line of exploration focuses on the causes of
violent actions. For example, violence has been explained as an effect of
relative deprivation (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962), resource allocations
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall1973, 1993) or political conditions
(Snyder 1979; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1978; Tilly et. al. 1975). The
other issue concerns the phase of a social movement in which violent
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actions take place (Blumer 1939; Hopper 1950; Turner and Killian 1987;
Tan-ow 1993, 1994; Feagin and Hahn 1973; McAdam 1983; Miller 1983;
McAdam and Moore 1989).
This paper discusses little about the causes of violent actions in
social movements and focuses on the second issue of whether there is a
specific movement stage which is particularly characterized by violent
actions. This issue is examined for the pattern of violent actions in the
sbi-sbi movement of 19th-century Japan. The sbi-sbi movement is
characterized by the persis tence of violent actions that had significant
effects on ongoing social and political struggles and the emergence of the
revolutionary situation.' The main tasks of this paper are 1) to evaluate
characterizations that relate violence to a particular social-movement
stage and, more specifically, 2) to assess empirically the contrasting
arguments about whether violence is a characteristic of an early or a later
phase of the shi-shi movement. The main questions to be explored in this
paper are: How do the arguments by the scholars relating violence with
stages apply to the sbi-sbi movement, and what does the shi-shi movement
suggest about the usefulness of identifying movement stages in terms of
the presence or absence of violence?
Violence as a Characteristic of Social Movement Stages
There are two contrasting arguments on the characterization of
social movement stages in tenns of violent actions. Some writing from
"collective behavior" perspectives view violent actions as prevalent in an
early stage of a movement (Blumer 1939; Hopper 1950; Turner and
Killian 1987). Others emphasizing the "political process"> variant of the
"resource mobilization" perspective argue that violent actions take place
in a later period of a social movement (farrow 1993, 1994; McAdam
1983, 1986; Miller 1983; Evans 1983; Della Porta 1995). This paper will
compare patterns of violence in the shi-shi movement in 19th-century
Japan with these contrasting characterizations of social-movement stages
in terms of violence.
Blumer's perspective on social movements raises important issues
for empirical analysis. Blumer conceives of a social movement as
"episodic in its career, with very scattered manifestations of activity..."
(1939, p.257). He claims, "It is necessary to view social movements from
1 Thus, the sbi-sbimovement is historically significant, as well as exhibiting an interesting
pattern ofviolent actions. The revolutionary situation it helped to create set the stage for the
Meiji Restoration (1868), the social revolution which began Japan's rapid transition from
feudalism to a modern system.
2 "Political process" writers emphasize political opportunity structures as well as
movement organizations and resources in understanding social movements.
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this temporal and developmental perspective..." (Blumer 1939, p.259).
He analyzes a career of a social movement as the development of
successive stages. "In their early stages, social movements are likely to
be merely an aggregation of individual lines of action based on individual
decisions ..." (Blumer 1939, p.258). A movement's "organization and its
culture are developed in the course of its career..." (1939, p.259).
Successive stages have "increasing organization" (Blumer 1939, p.259).
Sporadic, uncoordinated actions characterize the early stage and
organized, coordinated actions, a later stage.
Similarly, in their life-cycle models of social movements, Turner and
Killian (1987) and Hopper (1950) emphasize a developmental nature of
social movements which is characterized by the increasing organization
of movement actions. In these models, social movement action proceeds
from a dispersed stage to an organized stage. Violence is one type of
action specifically thought to occur in the early stage of a social
movement.' The mainissues of this paper in relation to the argument of
Blumer (1939) are, therefore: Does sporadic violence characterize an
early stage of the shi-shi movement? Does violence decrease or disappear
as a movement progresses, to be replaced by more organized and
coordinated actions?
Others argue that violent actions occur later in the career of a social
movement. Tarrow (1993, 1994) and Tilly (1993) examine repertoires of
contention in the cycles of protest and argue that an early stage of a
movement is characterized by the prevalence of "conventional" tactics
(farrow 1993, p.289) that minimize the costs of protest. These scholars
regard violent actions as prevalent in the later phase when social
movements lose their mass support (farrow 1994, p.103; McAdam 1983,
p.311; Feagin and Hahn 1973, p.43) and face countermovements (Della
Porta 1995, p.162). The later-stage characterization is also supported by
McAdam's "model of recruitment to high risk/high cost activism" which
argues that movement actions start with the "low cost/low risk activity"
and later move on to actions with higher risk (1986, p.68-71). This paper
will examine empirically their arguments that 1) violence is a
characteristic of a later movement stage, because 2) violence occurs
3Some tenus used to characterize actions in the early stage of a social movement, such as
"sporadic", "random and erratic behavior", "agitation", "dispersed", "impulsive behavior"
(Blumer 1939, pp.259, 260), "unorganized and unformulated" (Hopper 1950, p.271) can be
interpreted in different ways. Violence is by no means the only type of sporadic action, but
clearly is one of them (cf. Blumer 1978, p.1?). Violent actions are not necessarily sporadic
and unorganized. The researchers on collective violence (filly 1978; Snyder 1979; Snyder
and Tilly 1972; Rule 1988) show organized and coordinated aspects of violence. This paper
by no means denies a diversity in sporadic actions nor the coordination of some violent
actions. Rather, the initial question is whether violence constitutes an empirically valid
indicator of the stages of the sbi-sbimovement.
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when social movements lose resources and opportunities for
conventional political actions-,
In the following section, I will trace violent actions in an early phase
of the sbi-sbi movement. Then I will describe the concurrence of violent
actions with organized, sustained political campaigns in a later phase.
This empirical analysis of the sbi-sbi movement will show that sporadic
violent actions were continuous throughout the movement's career.
Moreover, close examination of the sbi-sbi movement indicates an
increase in sporadic violence when political opportunities for the shi-shi
expanded, rather than when other channels of social movement actions
closed.
The Shi-ShiMovement
The abolition of the shogunate political system in 1867 and the
sweeping reforms that followed, constituted the most dramatic political
transformation in Japanese history. Called the Meiji Restoration, this
social revolution was achieved through political actions taken by a variety
of actors, including the baku/II (the national shogun govemment), nobles
of the emperor's court, feudal domain bureaucrats, samurai, and foreign
states.
One of the factors that contributed to the failure of the shogun
governmental system was a series of actions attributed to sbi-sbi (literally,
men of high purpose), young samurai who began with little political
power. The shi-shi actions taken between 1858 and 1864, constitute the
sbi-sbi movement. These actions included terrorism against foreigners
and]apanese officials and campaigns for political influence in Kyoto, the
capitol, as well as in several important feudal domains.s This movement
significantly contributed to the creation of a revolutionary situation
which soon culminated in revolutionary outcomes ensuing from the Meiji
Restoration in 1868.
4 My di~cussion <:>n this point does not imply any causal conclusions on the relationships
between .vlole~t actl(~~s and loss of resources and opportunities, although their relationships
are examined In empirical analysesof social movements by the scholars (McAdam 1982, 1983;
Della. Porta 1995; Miller 1983; Tarrow 19?3, 1994). Rather, this paper simply raises the
question of the scholars' characterization of the coincidence ofviolence and loss of resources
and opportunities. In other words, this paper asks empirically whether violence in the shi-shi
movement coincided with. the changing political conditions in which the movement lost
support from outside groups, and thus political opportunity structure had contracted.
5The feudal domains in the Tokztgtm'a shogunate system are of three types: .Shinpan,
related, by blood ~o the TokJIgtmla family; fitdai, supporters of Toleugtl1lla when they
consolidated power In the battle of Sekigaham in 1600;and /ozama, opponents in the battle of
Sekigaham. Tozama domains were headed by subordinated, but rival families to the Toleugawa
sho~nate. Cbasb», Sal.rtlma, and Tosa were /ozama domains active in significant ways in the
political campaigns of the shi-shi movement
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Early Shi-Shi Violence
The sbi-sbi movement began, as Blumer (1939, p.259) suggests
movements do, as an aggregation of sporadic actions without central
coordination and control. Most of the significant actions taken in the
initial stage of the sbi-sbi movement were agitating acts of terrorism. On
June 2, 1859, in accordance with a commercial treaty concluded in the
previous year, the representatives from five countries (United States,
Great Britain, France, Russia, and Holland) began residing in Japan for
the purpose of international trades.
The first incident of terrorism occurred. against foreigners on July
20, 1859, when an officer and a seaman, both from Russia, were attacked
and cut to pieces. Russia planned retaliation, but settled for the baku/tis
official apology and its promise to arrest the assassins (Konishi 1966,
p.243). In October, a Chinese man employed by the French consulate
was attacked and killed (Konishi 1966, p.243). On January 7, 1860, a
translator for the British legation was killed. The baku/u (the shogun
government) paid compensation to Great Britain. Assassinations of two
Dutch merchant captains in February and of an Italian working for the
French consulate in June followed (Konishi 1966, p.244).
On December 5, 1860, Hendrix Heusken, a secretary and translator
for the U.S. representative was assassinated by sbi-sbi from Satsuma
domain (Hesselink 1994, pp.331-337). The baku/u paid $10,000 to
Heusken's family (Konishi 1966, pp.244-245). Then, in May, 1861,
fourteen sbi-sbi from Mito domain attacked the British legation in Edo.
They aimed. to kill all foreigners at the legation according to their
subsequent confession, but they were arrested first (Konishi 1966,
pp.245-246).
Except for the case of the attack on the British legation, no terrorists
responsible for these incidents were arrested. Because of the anonymity
of the assassins in most cases, it cannot definitely be asserted that all of
these. actions were actually taken by those who identified themselves as
sbi-sbi. These events, however, were seen as types of action the shi-shi
would take, because the anti-foreign character of these incidents
6 The haleuft (the shogun governmeut) had enforced the seclusion policy since the early
17th century until a treaty with Commodore Matthew C. Perry of America in 1854. The
controversy surrounding the opening of the country and the subsequent political p~ocess,
including the "~ei purge" against those who continued to resist the presence of foreigners,
constituted the setting for the shi-shi movement. Detailed descriptions of this political
process are provided by Beasley (1972), Craig (1961), Huber (1981),Jansen '(1961), Konishi
(1966),and Pyle (1978).
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corresponded wi th the shi-shls an ti- foreign sentiments (Morikawa 1967,
p.38; Konishi 1966, p.242; Shibahara 1975, pp.130-13l).
In an analysis of violence, such as terrorism, the question of whether
it was under the control of any particular groups or organizations must
be considered. Edwards argues that disruptive actions are "always raised
and organized for the purpose by a small group of leaders ... and
carefully planned out beforehand" (Edwards 1970[1927], p.l0l). Some
terrorist episodes were carried out by groups of sbi-sbi, and thus imply
some coordination. Unlike Edwards' assertion, however, there is no
indication that anti-foreign terrorism during these years was purposefully
planned and coordinated by any particular group. Rather, as Blumer
(1939) suggests, these anti-foreign actions in the early stage of the shi-shi
movement appear to be an aggregation of sporadic, separately-mounted
actions.
Violence against foreigners occurred frequently between 1859 and
1861.. During this early stage, however, "the most dramatic act of
terrorism was the assassination of [bakufu leader] Ii Naosuke, [a] symbol
of the arbitrary attitude of the bakufu and of its concession to the
foreigners" (Duus 1976, p.67). On March 3, 1860, eighteen shi-shi (one
from Satsuma domain and the others from Mito domain) attacked Ii's
procession at the Sakurada gate of Edo castle and killed him. Five of the
shi-shi lost their lives in the fighting. The others surrendered themselves
to the bakufu authority and submitted a prospectus explaining their action
(Konishi 1966, pp.151-156).
The significance of the assassination of Ii Naosuke for the political
process in Japan was enormous (Sakata and Hall 1956; Harootunian
1970; Duus 1976). First, it had an intimidating effect on the officials of
the bakufil and resulted in moderation of the bakufu policy (Sakata and
Hall 1956, p.43; Huber 1981, p.l(0). After Ii's assassination, the bakufu
never again asserted firm control in the state decision-making process.
Second, this event gave the shi-shi an example of a successful direct
action that influenced national politics (Beasley 1972, 1990). As Tilly
argues, prior success and failures may produce a "change in the
repertoire of collective actions" (1978, p.158). Before Ii's assassination,
no direct action against a Bakufu official with such superior status was
recorded in the Tokugawo period (Hirao 1930; Morikawa 1967), whereas
the shi-shi engaged in many direct actions against officials after Ii's
assassination. As Harootunian notes, the assassination of Ii marked the
beginning of"a new kind of play with the imperial capitol of Kyoto as its
stage" (1970, p.247).
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Blumer (1939) and some other scholars (for example, Hopper 1950;
Turner and Killian 1987) characterize actions at the beginnings of social
movements as not taken by an organization. During the early years of the
movement, shi-shi took a number of very similar terrorist actions. The
assassination of Ii and the violent attack of the British legation, at least,
were carried out by groups of shi-shi, implying coordination and planning.
There is, however, no indication of unified coordination or control of the
series of actions or the movement in its early stage. As Blumer (1939)
leads us to expect, the early stage of the shi-shi movement was an
aggregation of sporadic actions.
The Later Shi-Sbi Movement
After Ii's assassination, shi-shi attacks were less frequent for about
two years. Only two attacks of foreigners are "recorded. Then, an
attempt in early 1862 to assassinate Ando Nobumasa, one of the most
powerful bakufu officials after Ii, marked the beginning of the shi-shi
movement's most active period, which lasted until 1864. This later stage
followed Blumer's generalization that "as a social movement develops, its
behavior which was originally dispersed tends to become organized,
solidified and persistent" (1939, p.259). Shi-shi actions included
organized, centrally-coordinated political campaigns in Kyoto and several
feudal domains. Also, however, this phase of the sbi-sbi movement
mixed sporadic episodes of political terrorism with sustained political
campaigns. Sbi-sbi terrorism against Japanese political opponents
continued.
Concurrence of political campaigns and sporadic violence raises the
questions about characterizations 'which associate violence with
movement stages. In the sbi-sbi movement, sporadic violent actions
continued and increased in frequency during the later period of the
movement. The process of organized campaigns during- the sbi-sbi
movement follows the arguments of Blumer (1939), Hopper (1950) and
Turner and Killian (1987) that a movement proceeds from dispersed to
organized and coordinated action. In the sbi-sbi movement, however, an
increasing organization of movement actions did not entail a
disappearance or even a decrease of sporadic actions.
Secondly, in the shi-shi movement, violent actions increased when the
shi-shi gained the support of polity groups such as feudal domains and the
imperial court, then stopped when it lost that support. This is the reverse
of the argument by Tarrow (1994), McAdam (1983) and Miller (1983)
that violence occurs in the later period of a movement when activists
lose broad support. In the following section, I will describe the
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concurrence of organized shi-shi political campaigns with sporadic, but
consequential, violent actions.
Political Campaigns?
During the later stage of the shi-shi movement (1862-1864), those
who identified themselves as shi-shi conducted influential political
campaigns in Kyoto" and in some feudal domains, such as Choshu and
Satsu~~. After Ii's a~sassination, Ando Nobumasa attempted to placate
~ppOSltlon by adopting what was called the kobugattai policy, which
signified a poli.tical coalition between the imperial court and the bakufu
through a mamage between the shogun and a sister of the emperor. The
term "~ob/lgattal' embodied the ideal of cooperation of court nobility and
samuraz, presumably for the purposes of the whole society's well-being
(Totman 1975, p.393). Initially, this policy was supported by a number
of lords of great domains 9, including the tozama domains of Tosa,
Satsuma, and Choshu (~akata and Hall 1956, p.43). The kobugattai policy
permitted feudal domains to enter national politics. At the forefront was
Choshu, In 1861, the Nagai Uta, one of the Choshu top officials,
pr~posed to. ~e feudal lord of Choshu a strategy to participate in
national politics.w The Choshu lord agreed to this proposal and
submitted it to the court and the baku/u. The court and the bakuft
accepted the Choshu proposal.
Meanwhile, Shimazu Hisamitsu, a leader of Satsuma, was planning
the emergence of this important domain into national politics. On April
16, 1862, Shimazu arrived in Kyoto and began mediating between the
cou~ ~d the ~akufll. He submitted to the court a proposal for kobugattai
mediation, which was more favorable to the imperial court than that of
Choshu, Th~ court which had once supported the Choshu proposal,
now turned It down and accepted the Satsuma proposal. Satsuma's
ascendance in Kyoto was significant for the development of the shi-shi
7 Detailed descriptive ~tudies of the shi-shipolitical campaigns are provided by Totman
(1980),Craig (1959, 1961), and Beasley (1972).
8 Kyot~ was .the capital ofJapan. The shi~shi ~olitical campaigns in Kyoto were attempts to
exert national IOfluence through the growing importance of the imperial court which was
located there.
9 Konis~i points out that th~ meanin~ of kobugattai was taken in various ways. The bakNft
adopted this poh~y. to re~tore ItSauthority through the attachment to the emperor. For the
em~eror, th~ coahtton With the baleJijN was t~e fir~t step to stabilize the nation and to fight
~nst fore~~ers. For some feudal lords, this poltcy meant an opportunity to participate in
national ~oltttcs (Konishi 1966,p.216). Thus, the wide support for this policy was based on a
constellat~on ofperceived interests rather than consensus on the concept of the policy.
10 Nagai's proposal "was ostensibly a compromise between the interests of the court and of
the baleJijN" (Hub~r 1981, p.l02) and consisted of two steps. First, Japan should open the
country t~mporarl~y and acquire industrial and military power through trade. Then it would
return to Its seclusion policy under the leadership of the emperor with the bakuft cooperation
(Shibahara 1975, p.176).
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political campaigns, because it enabled shi-shi of Choshu to tum the
policy of this domain toward the anti-baku/u ide~logy of sonnojoz11
(Huber 1981,p.108; Craig 1961,p.174).
Before Choshu was superseded in national politics by Satsuma, the
shi-shi in Choshu had condemned Nagai's kobugattai proposal as no better
than the baku/u policy to open the country to foreigners. These sbi-sbi
opposed even the temporary discarding of the seclusion policy
(Shibahara 1975, p.178). Choshu's loss to Satsuma in the competition for
influence in Kyoto was the opportunity which permitted a shi-shi political
campaign to tum the government of Choshu toward a more radical
challenge to the baku/u. On July 6, 1862, the Choshu government
adopted sonno-joi as the official domain policy.
Once the sonno-foi position was adopted by the Choshu government,
sbi-sbi from Choshu began to exert influence on the imperial court in the
name of Choshu. Shi-shi contacted the court nobles who favored the
sonno-joi position'> and supported them. Also, shi-shi strengthened their
influence on the decisions of the court by frequent use of violence
against the bakufu officials and the court nobles who had the conflicting
political plans13.
Tilly argues that "contention of power consists of the application of
resources to influence other groups, and power itself consists of a
group's making its interests prevail over others with which they are in
conflict. Contention for political power involves applying resources to a
particular kind of organization: a government" (filly 1978, p.125). The
course of the shi-shi political campaign in Kyoto can be seen as a series of
resource acquisitions and applications. First, the shi-shi utilized their
personal relationships with Choshu officials to tum .the domain policy
toward sonnojoi. Then, the domain support for sonnojoi was utilized as a
resource to exert influence on the imperial court.
This political campaign proved effective. The imperial court which
had earlier dismissed Choshu's mediation in favor of that of Satsuma
now dropped Satsuma and aligned with Choshu. On August 27, 1862, an
imperial decree for the expulsion of foreigners was issued. On October
lISonno-joi literally means "revere the emperor and expel the barbarians." As a political
idea, it was the antithesis of kolmgattai position. Although both aimed at national
reconstruction and expulsion of foreigners, they differed over whether temporary entry of
foreigners into Japan was an acceptable method to achieve the goal.
12 In this paper, the term "sonno-joi court nobles" means the court nobles who favored the
sonno-joi position and cooperated the shi-sbi campaign.
13 I will call these court nobles "kolmgattai court nobles", since they supported the kobugattai
policy. The later-stage pattern of shi-shi violence is discussed in the next section of this
paper.
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27, an imperial mission handed the imperial decree of joi to the baku/u.
On December 5, the baku/uaccepted the joi order. In the meantime, the
sonno-foi court nobles in Kyoto and sbi-sbi samurai petitioned the court for
the creation of imperial troops, with the excuse of protecting the court
from the barbarians (Shibahara 1975, p.193). In the early months of
1863, the sbi-sbi of Choshu tightened their hold over the imperial court
by influencing the emperor through sonnojoi court nobles to create new
positions in the court and to appoint court nobles favorable to the sonno-
joi cause.
At the same time, shi-shi had been demanding in the name of the
imperial court that the baku/II set a definite date to carry out the joi order.
On April 20, the baklifu reluctantly informed the court that the expulsion
of the barbarians would begin on Ivlay 10, 1863 (Huber 1981, p.119).
These events suggest that in 1862 and 1863, for the first time in
Tokugawa period (1603-1867), national politics in Kyoto were no longer
controlled by the bakt(u. Shibahara claims that the political situation was
as if there were "two national governments within one nation" (1975,
p.202). The imperial court during these years was a resource gained and
used by shi-shi to legitimize their actions and to compete with the baktifu
policy.
The sbi-sbi activists directed sustained political campaigns at several
levels of the existing polity, most significantly toward the govemments of
several feudal domains, the imperial court, and the baku/u itself.
However, the concrete process of the sbi-sbi movement shows
concurrent sporadic violent actions were also a significant part of the
movement in 1862 and 1863. In the following section I will document
violent actions in this later phase of the sbi-sbi movement.
Later Shi-Shi Violence
Ando Nobumasa's kobugattai policy, begun in 1861, was initially well
accepted by the imperial court and even the lords of tozama domains with
little loyalty to the baku/u. Shi-shi activists opposed it, however. While
most powerful opponents of the baku/u still supported the koblgattai
policy, shi-shi criticized it, characterizing the marriage between the
shogun and the emperor' sister as sending her as a hostage to the baklifu
(Shibahara 1975, p.140). On January 15, 1862, four sbi-sbi from Mito
attacked Ando, who managed to escape with his life but lost his political
powert-, The shi-shi political campaigns (described above) followed.
14 The Japanese feudal system was led by individuals of the samurai (warrior) class. The
leade~ of the bakufu.was supposed to be the leader of warriors, whose code of behavior (at
l~ast Ideally) was chivalrous. Thus, escaping from the attack by the lower class samurai was
disgraceful enough to deprive Ando of his power in the system.
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A series of "tenchu" (heaven's revenge) assassinations coincided with
the shi-shi political campaigns. According to Huber, "tenchu was
unmistakably political in its timing, its objectives, its publicity activities
and its effects. One of the peculiarities ... lay in its uncanny timing....
The abrupt oscillations in the assassination rate can easily be explained by
reference to concurrent political events" (1982, pp.l09-110). During
1861 and the first half of 1862, only four incidents of political terrorism
had been recorded. Then, in the second half of 1862 and 1863, forty-six
terroristic incidents were recorded (Hirao 1930). Similar to the violent
actions during the early phase of the movement, there is no evidence that
these assassinations were under the coordination and control of any
particular social movement organization. Also, there is no indication .that
individual incidents of violence in the later phase were more organized
or centrally coordinated than the incidents in the early phase of the
movement.
The first tench« assassination was of Shimada Sakon on July 20, 1862
(Konishi 1966, p.257; Shibahara 1975, p.186; Huber 1982, p.l1Z).
Shimada, a retainer of a court noble, had spied on opponents of the
international treaty which permitted foreigners to enter Japan to trade.
Shimada revealed opponents' identities to the bakufu who killed many of
them during the Ansei purge. Tanaka Shinbei, a sbi-sbi from Satsuma,
killed Shimada, whose head was publicly displayed. A script was left with
his head, saying "he is a great traitor unfit for heaven or earth" (Huber
1982, p.113). In August, 1862, Okada Izo, a sbi-sbi from Tosa, killed and
publicly displayed the head of a baku/u officer who also had played a role
in the Ansei purge.
"The largest single stroke of tenchu assassination" (Huber 1982,
p.112) occurred on September 23, 1862. Four bakufu officials in Kyoto,
on their way to Edo, were killed by a group of sbi-sbi, which included
Tanaka (from Satsuma), Okada (from Tosa), and Kusaka (from Choshu).
The assassinated officials were sergeants of police under the baku/rls city
commissioner in Kyoto, and had been very active during the .Ansei purge
(Shibahara 1975, p.188; Huber 1982, p.112). In early 1863, violent
actions continued against court nobles and bakufu officials (Morikawa
1967; Hirao 1930).
Edwards argues that "terrorism is under the control of small number
of individuals" ([1927] 1970, p.103). There is not sufficient evidence,
however, to support an argument that the series of tenchu assassinations in
the shi-shi movement can be explained by the coordination of a small
number of particular individuals. Oliver notes that "social movements
are ... made up of lots of small collective units, each [possibly] acting
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autonomously in accord with their own intemallogic" (Oliver 1989, p.4).
Actions and events within a movement influence each other, but they are
"outside the control or direction of any person or organization" (Oliver
1989, p.4). Seeing the shi-shi movement in 1862-63 as interdependent
actions without centralized control seems consistent with Huber's (1981)
careful conclusion that "the sympathetic nobles in the court provided the
shi-shi movement with imperial support for radical activism. The court,
Choshu, and tenchu assassinations worked in concert" (Huber 1981,
p.118). The imperial court's acceptance of Choshu's sonnojoi proposal
and the personal relationships between the shi-shi activists and the
officials in Choshu affected the occurrence and timing of shi-sbi direct
action. This does not mean that shi-shi violence was centrally controlled
or coordinated.
The vital political role of mediation between the court and the
baktfu wa~ given to Choshu in the summer of 1862. It was precisely
dunng this ascendancy of shi-shi-Ied Choshu in national politics that
political assassinations -- carried out by shi-shi who supported the same
sonno-joi objectives advocated by Choshu -- occurred most frequently in
Kyoto. Huber concludes that the shi-shi who engaged in the
~ssassinatio~s. were ~ost certainly responding to the significantly
uNproved political environment that the Choshu mediation represented
(Huber 1982, p.l10). Huber's argument of reciprocity between Choshu's
political ascendance and the tenchu assassinations is also supported by the
fact that assassinations ceased as soon as Choshu sonnojoi faction was
expe~ed from Kyoto in the summer of 1863. These significant patterns
of violence in the shi-shi movement seem to directly contradict certain
interpretations of "later stage" violence.
Discussion
This paper has traced the process of the shi-shi movement, and raised
the issue of the characterization of social movement stages in terms of
violence. The .literature shows contrasting viewpoints on violence and
move~~nt stages. Some scholars (Blumer 1939; Hopper 1950; Turner
~d Killian 1987) characterize violence as a sporadic type of action found
in an early movement stage. Others (farrow 1993; McAdam 1983;
Miller 1983; Feagin and Hahn 1973) say that violence is characteristic in
a later movement stage which occurs after the loss of outside support
and resources.
The examination of the shi-shi movement reveals several contrasts
with these arguments. First, the characterization of movement stages in
terms o~ ~e presence or the absence of violent actions does not capture
the empirical patterns in the shi-shi movement. As this paper has shown,
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violent actions continuously occurred in the sbi-sbi movement. As
Blumer (1939) argues, the sbi-sbi movement shows the prevalence of
sporadic violent actions in an early movement stage. Also, as Blumer
leads us to expect, organized political campaigns developed in the later
stage of the movement. Unlike Blumer's model, however, uncoordinated
sporadic violent actions continued to occur during the later phase of the
sbi-sbi movement. They were interdependent with, but apparently not
coordinated by the organized political campaigns. Also, unlike Tarrow
(1994), McAdam (1983) and Miller (1983) suggest, violent actions are not
confined to a later period of the social movement.
Second, unlike the argument that violent actions occur when
political opportunities for movements contract, violent actions occurred
continuously (and increased) in the shi-shi movement when political
opportunity had expanded in favor of the shi-shi causes. The coincidence
of tencbt: assassinations and the success of shi-shi political campaigns
shows that violent actions may increase even when political opportunities
allow more conventional actions. In this case, at least, violence is not an
effect of narrowing support or the loss of resources.
These empirical differences of the shi-shi movement from the
theoretical models of violence and movement stages direct students of
social movements to several issues. First, the description of the shi-shi
movement suggests a different basis for stage distinctions. The sbi-sbi
movement can be divided into stages, not in terms of types of actions,
but in terms of expansions of its repertoire of actions. Blumer's notion
of a movement's stage is based on types of action, "sporadic, dispersed"
actions in the early phase and "organized, solidified and persistent"
actions in the later period (1939, p.259). The shi-shi movement shows
that the early sporadic violent actions were supplemented by rather than
replaced by organized, coordinated action in a later stage. The repertoire
of actions actually used in the movement diversified as it developed'>,
Thus, instead of characterizing each phase of the shi-shi movement in
terms of a type of prevalent action, it is more correct to say that the
transition to a later stage occurred when the repertoire of actions actually
used by movement participants expanded.
15 Tarrow (1989, pp.49-56, 1993, pp.284-287) discusses the cycle of protest and the
expansion of the repertoire of contention. Tarrow argues that "new forms of collective
action develop within the experimental context of cycles of protest. The most successful
becomes part of the future repertoire of collective action" (1993, p.286). My argument of
repertoire of actions as the basis of stage differs from Tarrow's discussion in the sense that
Tarrow views the repertoire as "not only what people do, [but] what they know how to do"
(1993,p.283). Movement stages are distinguished in terms of actions taken, not actions that
could be taken.
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Second, during the sbi-sbi movement, violent actions coincided with
organized political campaigns. That is, violent actions occurred most
frequently when the structure of political opportunity was most favorable
for movement participants to use non-violent actions. This contrasts
with the concrete patterns of violence attributed to the American civil
rights movement and student movements in the United States. In these
movements (as Tarrow, 1994, observes), violent actions occurred when
the movements lost outside support and the political opportunities
became unfavorable. Further analysis of the social mechanisms relating
political opportunity with movement violence is necessary.
Third, the usefulness of the notion of a generalized social movement
career needs to be reassessed. A characterization of the phases of any
social movement can provide a model to compare and contrast with
other cases. The stages characterized from the analysis of the sbi-sbi
movement, however, are not claimed to be a generalizable model of
social-movement careers. Rather, it is a "hypothesis forming model" .
(Kalberg 1994) which may be used to focus empirical examinations of
other cases.
This paper has discussed contrasting characterizations of the place
of violence in stages of social movements, as it examined the sbi-sbi
movement in 19th century Japan. It is a single case study. It by no
means constitutes a fully-developed criticism of the characterizations of
movement stages in terms of violence. The results of this empirical
study of the shi-shi movement, however, vary from Blumer's or Tarrow's
tendencies to see violence as characteristic of a particular stage of social
movements. At least, this analysis of the. sbi-sbi movement, points out a
significant variation from models that characterize movement stages in
terms of violent actions.
References
Beasley, William G. 1972. The Mezji Restoration. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
___,. 1990. TheRise ofModern Japan. London: Wedenfeld & Nicolson.
Blumer, Herbert. 1939. "Collective Behavior." Pp. 221-280 in An Outline
ofthePrinciples ofSociology, edited by Robert E. Park. New York:
Barnes & Noble Inc.
___.1978. "Social Unrest and Collective Protest." Studies in Symbolic
Interaction 1:1-54.
182
Violence in the Shi-Shi Movement
Craig, Albert M. 1959. "The Restoration Movement in Choshu." JournaL of
Asian Studies 18:187-197.
___. 1961. Cbosba in the Meiji Restoration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Davies, James C. 1962. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American
Sotiological Review 27:5-19.
Della Porta, Donatella. 1995. Social Movements, PoliticaL 'Violence, and the
State. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Duus, Peter. 1976. TheRiseofModenJ Japan. Boston: Houghton 1vfifflin.
Edwards, Lyford. 1970[1927]. The Natural History of Revolution. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Evans, Ernest. 1983. "The Use of Terrorism by American Social
Movements." Pp. 252-261 in Social Movements of the Si:x:ties and
Seventies, edited by Jo Freeman. New York: Longman.
Feagin, Joe R., and Harlan Hahn. 1973. Ghetto Revolt. New York:
MacMillan Publishing Co.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. W~ Men Rebel Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Harootunian, Harry D. 1970. Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political
Consaousness in Tokugawa Japan. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Hesselink, Reinier H. 1994. "The Assassination of Henry Heusken."
Monumenta Nippomca 49:331-351.
Hirao, Michie. 1930. Isbin Ansatsu Hiroku (Records of Assassination in
the Restoration Era). Tokyo: Hakuyusha.
Hopper, Rex. 1950. "Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for
the Study of Revolutionary Movements." Social Forces 28:270-
279.
Huber, Thomas M. 1981. The Revolutionary Origins of Modem Japan.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
183
MARS/ Social Thought & Research
___. 1982. "Men of High Purpose and the Politics of Direct Action,
1862-1864." in Conflict in Modern Japanese History, edited by
Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Jansen, Marius. 1961. Sakamoto 19'0ma andthe Meiji Restoration. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kalberg, Stephen. 1994. Max Weber's Comparative-Histoncal Sociolngy.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Konishi, Shiro. 1966. Kaikoku to Joi (The Opening of Japan and
Expulsion Movement). Tokyo: Chuo-Koron.
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black
. Insu18enry, 1930-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
___,. 1983. "The Decline of the Civil Rights Movement." Pp. 298-
319 in Social Movements 0/ the Sixties and Seventies, edited by Jo
Freeman. New York: Longman.
---' 1986. "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of
Freedom Summer." .Amencan Journal ofSociology 92:64-90.
McAdam, Doug, and Kelly: Moore. 1989. "The Politics of Black
Insurgency, 1930-1975." Pp. 255-285 in ~/iolence in America:
Protest, RebeUion, RefOrm, edited by Ted Robert Gurr. Newbury
Park, CA: Sage Publications.
McCarthy, John, and Mayer Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and
Social Movements: A Partial Theory." American JournaL of
Sociology 82:1212-1241.
Miller, Fredrick D. 1983. "The End of SDS and the Emergence of
Weathennan: Demise Through Success" Pp, 279-297 in SociaL
Move/nents of the Sixties andSeventies, edited by Jo Freeman. New
York: Longman.
Morikawa, Tetsuro. 1967. Bakumatsu .Ansatsusbi (History of Assassination
during Bakumatsu Period). Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo.
Oberschall, Anthony. 1973. SociaL Conflict and SociaL Movements.
Englewoo.d Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.
184
Violence in the Shi-Shi Movement
___. 1993. SociaL Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Oliver, Pamela E. 1989. "Bringing the Crowd Back In." Research in SociaL
Movements, Conflicts andChange 11:1-30.
Pyle, Kenneth. 1978. The Making ojModern [apan. Lexington, MA: D.C.
Heath and Company.
Rule, James B. 1988. Theories of Civil Violence. Berkeley: University of
California press.
Sakata, Yoshio, and John W. Hall. 1956. "The Motivation of Political
Leadership in the Meiji Restoration." [asma: of Asian Studies
16:31-50.
Shibahara, Takuji. 1975. Koikoku (The Opening of Japan).
Tokyo:Shogakukan.
Snyder, David. 1979. "Collective Violence Processes: Implications for
Disaggregated Theory and Research." Research in SociaL
Movements, Corflic: andChange 2:35-61.
Snyder, David, and Charles Tilly. 1972. "Hardship and Collective
Violence in France, 1830 to 1960." American SociologicaL RevieJv
37:520-532.
Tarrow, Sidney. 1989. Struggle, Politics, and RefOrm: ColLective Action, Soaal
Jvlovements, and Cycles of Protest. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University,
Western Societies Paper no.21.
___. 1993. "Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of
Madness and the Repertoire of Contention." Social Science History
17:281-307.
___. 1994. Power In }y{ovement. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to RevoLution. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
___. 1993. "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834."
SociaL Science History 17:253-280.
185
MARS/ SociaL Thought & Research
Tilly, Charles, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly. 1975. TheRebeLLious Century:
1830-1930. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Totman, Conrad. 1975. "Tokugawa Yoshinobu and Kobugattai: A Study
of Political Inadequacy." Monumenta Nipponica 30:393-403.
___,. 1980. TheCollupse ofthe Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868. Honolulu:
University Press of Hawaii ..
Turner, Ralph H., and Louis M. Killian. 1987. CoUective Behavior (3rd ed.).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
186
BOOKS: REVIEWS AND ESSAYS
THE PEOPLE, THE ENEMY, AND THE
VISION: A REVIEW ESSAY
MiUennium Rage: Survivalists, W'hite Supremacists, and the Doomsdoy Prophery.
By Philip Lamy. 1996. New York: Plenum Press. Hardback. 295 pages.
Fascism: Past, Present, and Future. By Walter Laquer. 1996. New York:
Oxford University Press. Hardback. 263 pages.
AU-American Monster: The UnauthoriiYd Biograpf!y of Timothy MeVeigh. By
Brandon M. Stickney. 1996. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Hardback. 336 pages.
GEORGE LUNDSKOW
Universi!y ofKansas
1vlARS/Social Thought & Research, 1997, Vol.2), No. 1-2
Increasingly, scholars are looking at right-wing extremist and fascist
movements today in the post cold war era. Instead of broader freedom,
opportunity, and peace, the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought
uncertainty, fear, and aggression. Some, of the new movements chillingly
recall Nazism and fascism from mid-century, while other incorporate
new beliefs and agendas. A full understanding requires an historical
perspective, to understand the development of the beliefs and changes
over time as social conditions change, and also a look at what type of
./ person joins an extremist movement, and why. All three books rely
primarily on historical narrative. Although the timeframe varies, all seek
to reconstruct the past as a means to understand the present. All three
more or less succeed with this effort, but all three similarly lack a theory
, to explain possible causal relationships. Basically, they narrate historical
events in their proper context, but they mosdy do not discuss the
findings beyond their immediate meaning. All three tend to take what
people or groups say about themselves at face value, and do not critically
analyze it further. Lamy and Laquer in particular discuss the wide array
of right-wing extremist groups today, an array sufficiently diverse that the
